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Abstract

This essay fills a gap by exploring compliance theory in international law to the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights. After introducing the topic and setting the context, it
delves into the question of why nations follow international law. Interacting with
prominent theoretical models (including the managerial model, fairness and legitimacy,
transnational legal process, self-interest, and a comparative perspective with Europe), it
arrives at a critical synthesis in the conclusion.

Member State Compliance with the Judgments of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights in its Inception Phase
Non-compliance with the judgments of a court, considered the serious offence of
"contempt of court" here in the United States, can carry serious penalties, especially
criminal contempt of court.1 In the case of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,2

1

18 USCS §401 (2005); see also Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958); Rebecca Yoheved Starr,
Twenty-Eighth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: Authority of the Trial Judge, 87 GEO. L.J. 1590
(1999).
2
“The Inter-American Court of Human Rights is the sole judicial organ in the Inter-American human
rights system. As such, it is the final arbiter of human rights in those American States that have ratified the
American Convention on Human Rights.” JO M. PASQUALUCCI, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTERAMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2003); see also Thomas Buergenthal, The Inter-American Court of
Human Rights 76A.I.J.L 231 (1982). Since the Inter -American system of Human Rights was created, the
creation of a judicial organ was a vital necessity. See CARLOS GARCIA BAUER, LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS
EN AMERICA [The Human Rights in America] (1987). “The Court’s purpose is specifically defined as the
application and interpretation of the Convention. In carrying out its purpose the Court exercises both an
adjudicatory and advisory jurisdiction.” SCOTT DAVIDSON, THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS (1992); see also Jo M. Pasqualucci, Advisory Practice of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights: Contributing to the Evolution of International Human Rights Law 38 STAN. J INT’L L. 241 (2002).
For more information on the advisory jurisdiction, see MANUEL E. VENTURA ROBLES & DANIEL ZOVATTO,
LA FUNCION CONSULTIVA DE LA CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS: NATURALEZA Y
PRINCIPIOS [ THE ADVISORY JURISDICTION OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: NATURE
AND PRINCIPLES] (1982-1987). For more information about the operation of the Human Rights Court, see
Antonio Augusto Cancado Trindade, The Operation of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in THE
INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS (David J. Harris & Stephen Livingstone eds., 1998). For a
detailed history of the Inter-American Court of Human Right, see also Víctor Rodríguez Rescia & Marc
David Seitles, The Development of the Inter-American Human Rights System: A Historical Perspective and
a Modern-Day Critique 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 593 (2000); LA CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE
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hereinafter called the IACHR, the sequellae seem less overt yet nonetheless maintain a
sizable influence.3 One might ask how a court such as the IACHR, given its lack of
police or armed forces to enforce its orders, could possibly have a high rate of
compliance from sovereign states. Yet at least at a certain level, the Court has had a very
high level of compliance.4
It can be argued, as Prof. Douglass Cassel at Northwestern University School of
Law does, that the Court has only had one and half full-blown defiant responses.5 He
writes especially about the Peru crisis6 (but also mentions Trinidad and Tobago)7 in "Peru
Withdraws from the Court: Will the Inter-American Human Rights System Meet the
Challenge?"8

DERECHOS HUMANOS [The Inter-American Court of Human Rights] (1986); The Inter-American Court of
Justice, at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2005).
3
There are less overt but nonetheless real and perceived consequences for not complying: they can come
in diplomatic, economic, political and social dimensions, for examples.
4
While the Court has eventually received compliance with its reparation orders, it has had difficulty in
getting State compliance with orders for States to press criminal prosecution in their domestic systems.
5
Douglass Cassel, Peru Withdraws from the Court: Will the Inter-American Human rights System meet the
Challenge? 20 HUM. RTS. L.J. 167, 167-168 (1999).
6
“The interaction between Peru and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Court) over the last few
years has spawned a series of pathbreaking events. The Court issued unprecedented remedial judgments in
cases that were brought against Peru under the American Convention of Human Rights and that arose out
of the conviction and sentencing of civilians in military tribunals by so-called faceless judges pursuant to
emergency decree laws on terrorism and treason. For the first time in its history, the Court ordered a state
to release a prisoner, to nullify judgments of its courts and to reform its domestic laws.” Bernard H. Oxman
& Karen C. Sokol, International Decision: Ivcher Bronstein Human Rights—Law of treaties –Jurisdiction
of Inter-American Court of Human Rights—Effect of Attempted Withdrawal of Jurisdiction, 95 AM. J. INT'L
L. 178 (2001).
7
Trinidad and Tobago, which had been a State Party, denounced the American Convention on May 26,
1998, effective May 26, 1999. PASQUALUCCI, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 2; see also Richard J.
Wilson & Jan Perlin, The Inter-American Human Rights System: Activities from Late 2000 Through
October 2002, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 651 (2003).
8
Cassel, supra note 5, at 167; see also Karen C. Sokol, Human Rights-laws of Treaties-Jurisdiction of
Inter-American Court of Human Rights-Effect of Attempted Withdrawal of Jurisdiction, 95 AM. J. OF INT’L
L. 178-185 (2001). Sokol writes about the path-breaking nature of the interactions between Peru and the
IACHR.
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Cassel first lays out a foundational paradox found in the Inter-American system of
human rights:9 the IACHR is at the zenith of its acceptance as well as the exercise of its
broad formal powers yet it contends with a relative paucity of diplomatic support.10 This
divide came to the forefront during the crisis of Peru's attempted withdrawal from the
Court.11
Peru, which through former President Fujimori (who fled the country in October
200012) had tried to openly defy the Court,13 has since formally re-entered its place within
the Court's jurisdiction.14 Ivcher,15 who had lost his television station, has had his station

9

“The inter-American human rights system is composed of a series of international documents. The
principal human rights tools include: the American Convention on Human Rights, and its accompanying
protocols; the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights; and the Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the
Death Penalty. In addition, three regional inter-American conventions seek to broaden the scope of
protected human rights: the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture; the Inter-American
Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons; and the Inter-American Convention for the Prevention,
Punishment, and Eradication of Violence Against Women.” Rescia & Seitles, supra note 2; see also
DAVIDSON, supra note 2; TOM FARER, THE RISE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME: NO
LONGER A UNICORN, NOT YET AN OX, THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1998); Jo. M.
Pasqualucci, Victim Reparations in the Inter-American Human Rights System: A Critical Assesssment of
Current practice and procedure, 18 MICH J. INT’L L. 19 (1996).
10
Supra note 5, at 167; see, e.g., Financial Situation of the Court, 1997-1998 INTER-AM. CT. H.R. 31,
OAS/Ser. L/III.29, doc. 5 (1998).
11
Cassell, supra note 10. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights was informed by the Peruvian
Embassy in Costa Rica that Peru adopted Legislative Resolution No. 27401 on January 18th, 2001. This
Resolution charges the Executive Branch to do everything necessary to re-establish the State of Peru under
the contentious jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/PRENSA/2001/cp_2_esp.htm] (last visited 2003).
12
“A popular uprising in the year 2000 forced Fujimori to flee to Japan, where he was seeking protection as
a national, so as not to stand trial for multiple human rights violations” Sonia Picado, The Evolution of
Democray and Human Rights in Latin America: A Ten Year Perspective No. 3, HUM. RTS. BRIEF 28
(2004).
13
“Peru made history by becoming the first state to deposit its withdrawal from the Court's jurisdiction
without denouncing the American Convention. The Court deemed the withdrawal ineffective: even though
states may ratify the American Convention before or without ever accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of
the Court, once they do accept that jurisdiction, they may denounce it only through denunciation of the
Convention as a whole.” Peru may therefore not return to the status quo ante; once committed to the
American Convention and the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, it is both or none. Oxman & Sokol,
supra note 6.
14
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/PRENSA/2001/cp_4_esp.htm 4
(last visited Sept. 2003). The Ivcher Bronstein case, Interpretation of the Judgment on the Merits: Art. 67
American Convention on Human Rights, Judgment of September 4, INTER-AM. CT. H.R., (ser. c), No. 84
(2001), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/84-ing.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2005). During
this session, the Court delivered on the 6th of February. The Court decided unanimously:
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1. to declare that the State violated the right to a nationality found in Article 20.1 and 20.3 of the
American Convention of Human rights against Baruch Ivcher Bronstein.
2. to declare that the State violated the judicial rights in Article 8.1 and 8.2 of the American
Convention of Human Rights against Baruch Ivcher Bronstein.
3. to declare that the State violated the right to judicial protection found in Article 25.1 of the
American Convention of Human Rights against Baruch Ivcher Bronstein.
4. to declare that the State violated the right to private property found in Articles 21.1 and 21.2 of
the American Convention of Human Rights against Baruch Ivcher Bronstein.
5. to declare that the State violated the right of free expression found in Articles 13.1 and 13.3 of
the American Convention of Human Rights against Baruch Ivcher Bronstein.
6. to declare that the State did not meet its general obligation in Article 1.1 of the American
Convention of Human Rights in connection with the violations of substantive rights spoken of in
the previous resolution points prior to this Sentence.
7. that the State ought to investigate the deeds which generated the violations established in the
present Sentence in order to identify and sanction the ones responsible for them.
8. that the State ought to facilitate the conditions for Baruch Ivcher Bronstein would be able
recover the use and enjoyment of his rights as the majority owner of his Latin American Company
as it was before August 1, 1997 according to the terms of the domestic legislation. Domestic law
applies to the compensation pertaining to the dividends as the majority shareholder. For all of
this, the respective requests ought to be submitted to the competent, national authorities.
9. The State ought to pay in equity Baruch Ivcher Bronstein an indemnization of $20,000.00 or its
equivalent in Peruvian currency to effectuate the payment of moral damages.
10. In equity, the State ought to pay Baruch Ivcher Bronstein the sum of $50,000.00 U.S. dollars
or its Peruvian equivalent to make him whole for the costs related to the domestic as well as
international litigation.
11. The Court would supervise the execution of the Sentence until the closing of the case.
On March 14th, 2001, the Court decided the following in regards to the Ivcher Bronstein case:
1. To lift the provisional measures ordered by the Court in its resolutions of November 21st and
23rd, 2000 in favor of Baruch Ivcher Bronstein, his wife, Neomy Even de Ivcher, and their
daughters Dafna Ivcher Even, Michal Ivcher Even, Tal Ivcher Even and Hadaz Ivcher Even as
well as Ms. Rosario Lam Torres and Julio Sotelo Casanova, Jose Arrieta Matos, Emilio
Rodriguez Larra?, Fernando Via? Villa, Menachem Ivcher Bronstein y Roger Gonzalez.
2. To communicate the present Resolution to the State and to the Inter-American Commission.
3. To archive the legal proceedings relative to the provisional measures in this case. Tribunal
Constitucional de Peru at http://www.tc.gob.pe/ (last visited February 18th, 2005).
[again unofficial paraphrase/translation of official material on the Court's web page] The InterAmerican Court of Human Rights in San Jose, Costa Rica in its sessions from January 29th to
February 9th, 2001, decided the following matters:
1. The Constitutional Court case. During the time of these sessions, the Court delivered this
sentence on January 31st:
Unanimously,
1. to declare that the State violated judicial guarantees found in Article 8 of the Convention against
Manuel Aguirre Roca, Guillermo Rey Terry y Delia Revoredo Marsano.
2. to declare that the State violated the right to judicial protection found in Article 25 of the
Convention against Manuel Aguirre Roca, Guillermo Rey Terry y Delia Revoredo Marsano.
3. to declare that the State did not fulfill its general obligation under Article 1.1 of the Convention
with respect to the violations of the substantive rights in the previous resolution points in this
Sentence.
4. that the State ought to order an investigation to determine the responsible parties in the human
rights violations that were done in the matters pertaining to this Sentence in order to reveal the
results of this investigation and punish those responsible.
5. that the State ought to pay the amounts corresponding with the salaries in conformity with the
legislation to Manuel Aguirre Roca, Guillermo Rey Terry y Delia Revoredo Marsano, in
agreement with what was established in paragraphs 121 and 128 of this Sentence.
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restored to him.16 The Peruvian Constitutional Court Justices17 ousted by former
President Fujimori have been reinstated.18 The Court can count itself the victor through
the Peruvian crisis.19
Trinidad and Tobago,20 which withdrew over capital punishment cases,21 has
rejoined (with reservations) the community of Latin American nations under the

6. In equity, that the State ought to pay the costs of the victims of the present case in accordance
with paragraphs 126 and 128 of this sentence the following amounts: to Mr. Manuel Aguirre Roca
US$25,000.00 or its Peruvian equivalent at the time of effectuating the payment; to Mr. Guillermo
Rey Terry US$25,000.00 or its Peruvian equivalent at the time of effectuating the payment; and
Mr. Delia Revoredo Marsano US$35,000.00 at the time of effectuating the payment.
7. that the Court would supervise the completion of the Sentence until the conclusion of the case.
The Constitutional Court case Provisional Measures on March 14th, 2001, the Court resolved:
1. To lift the provisional measures ordered by the Court in its Resolution of August 14th, 2000 for
Delia Revoredo Marsano.
2. To communicate the present Resolution to the State of Peru and to the Inter-American
Commission of Human Rights.
3. To archive the legal proceedings.
15
See Oxman & Sokol, supra note 6.
16
See Wilson & Perlin, supra note 7.
17
See Interpretation of the Judgment on the Merits: Art. 67 American Convention on Human Rights,
Judgment of September 4, supra note 18.
18
Jurisdiction, Resoluciones y Sentencias, Series C, No. 55 (2000), available at http://corteidh
oea.nu.or.cr/ci/PUBLICAC/SERIE_C/C_55_ESP.HTM (March 7, 2005); see also Interpretation of the
Judgment on the Merits: Art. 67 American Convention on Human Rights, Judgment of September 4, supra
note 18, “While Ivcher was struggling to regain his citizenship and his rights in the television station,
President Alberto Fujimori, serving his second term, was endeavoring to overcome the limitations of Peru's
1993 Constitution, which prohibits a president from serving more than two consecutive terms. Fujimori's
first term began in 1990, three years before the Constitution came into effect. In 1996, the Peruvian
Congress enacted a statute that interpreted the term limitation as inapplicable to presidential terms that
began prior to the approval of the Constitution. Three of the seven justices (with two abstentions) on Peru's
Constitutional Tribunal (Tribunal Constitutional) invalidated the new statute, however, as it 'applied to the
specific case of the incumbent President's candidacy for the office of President in the year 2000,' thereby
threatening to frustrate Fujimori's ambitions for a third presidential term. Four months later, the Congress
impeached the three justices and then voted in favor of removing them from the Constitutional Tribunal.
Pursuant to a petition filed by a number of Peruvian congressional deputies, the Commission issued a report
finding that Peru had violated the justices' rights to a fair trial, as well as the right of all Peruvians to an
independent and impartial justice system. The Commission recommended that Peru reinstate the justices,
but Peru failed to comply or to reach a friendly settlement after negotiations with the petitioners. The
Commission then submitted the case to the Court.” See also Oxman & Sokol, supra note 6.
19
For more details about the Peruvian crisis, see ANA SALADO OSUNA, LOS CASOS PERUANOS ANTE LA
CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS [PERU’ S CASES BEFORE THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT
OF HUMAN RIGHTS] (2004).
20
Wilson & Perlin, supra note 7.
21
“During 2001 and 2002, the Court decided both the admissibility and merits of a collection of death
penalty cases from Trinidad and Tobago (‘Trinidad’). The Court first considered Trinidad's preliminary
objections in three separate cases, the Hilaire Case, the Benjamin et al. Case, and the Constantine et al.
Case. The cases were later consolidated for disposition on the merits and reparations under the name
Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago. All of these cases present complex issues
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jurisdiction of the Court. So the Court has prevailed through the one and a half outright
challenges against it, both with Peru as well as Trinidad and Tobago.22
As of yet, no one has assessed the general state of compliance to the IACHR.23
This article aims to start filling this gap in the scholarly literature. It also seeks to provide
some theoretical grounding to compliance with international law, why the Court has
received the degree of compliance it has had, as well as theory based clues to how the
Court might gain greater compliance and influence24—since its work plays a critical role
in bringing greater justice to this hemisphere.25

Background and Foundation:
A brief background of the Inter-American human rights system helps to set the
stage for understanding the history, practice and procedure of the Inter-American court,
which in turn gives context to the issue of compliance.26

of treaty application and treaty reservations, arising from Trinidad's aggressive efforts to defend its death
penalty regime. Because of its desire to speed up executions, Trinidad withdrew its ratification of the
Convention on May 26, 1999, one year after its announced intention to do so. The Commission and Court
nonetheless continue to apply the Convention to all pending cases that arose when the Convention was in
effect” Id.
22
Interview with Professor Douglass Cassel, Northwestern University School of Law (Feb. 8, 2001).
23
Id.; also see Mark W. Janis, The Efficacy of Strasbourg Law, 15 CONN. J. OF INT'L L. 39 (2000). Janis
notes gaps in the compliance literature for the European system. There seem to be appreciably more gaps
in the existing Inter-American human rights system literature.
24
“Evaluating accomplishments and prospects in the area of international human rights law recalls the oftused rhetorical question about whether the glass is half empty or half full. As far as human rights are
concerned, if the question is 'how much has been achieved,' the answer must be 'a great deal.' If the
question is 'how much remains to be achieved,' the answer will be the same: 'a great deal.' This statement
made by Thomas Buergenthal about the accomplishment of international human rights in general could be
applied to the Inter-American system of Human Rights. Thomas Buergenthal, International Human Rights
Law and Institutions; Accomplishments and Prospects, 63 WASH L. REV. 1 (1988); see also, Michael F.
Cosgrove, Protecting the Protector: Preventing the Decline of the Inter-American System for the
Protection of Human Rights, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’ L L. 39 (2000).
25
See THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & DOUGLASS CASSEL, EL FUTURO DEL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO DE
PROTECCION DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS [THE FUTURE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN
RIGHTS] INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1998).
26
See THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & DINAH SHELTON, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS: CASES
AND MATERIALS (4th ed., 1995).
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The Court was installed in Costa Rica through a series of acts starting from
September 3, 1979 in the National Theater of San Jose. The National Theatre,
appropriately enough, was the location where the American Convention (with which the
Court is supposed to adjudicate) had been drafted close to a decade earlier.27
The Convention entered into force on July 18, 1978 when Grenada deposited its
instrument of ratification to the Convention. Grenada acted as the pivotal eleventh
member state of the OAS to do so.28 On May 22, 1979, the States Parties to the
Convention elected seven judges to serve as the original Inter-American Court of Human
Rights.29
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights is the sole judicial organ in the InterAmerican human rights system. As such, it is the final arbiter of human rights in those
American States that have ratified the American Convention on Human Rights. As of
January 2003, twenty-four of the thirty-five Member States of the OAS are State Parties
to the American Convention.30
During its early years, the Court’s prospects for improving the human rights of the
people of the Americas appeared uninspiring. Dictators in the Western Hemisphere
perpetrated gross and systematic violations of human rights. State-sponsored forced
disappearances, extra-judicial killings, and torture were commonplace. The court’s

27

Installation of the Court, 1980- 1983 INTER-AM. CT. H.R. 9, OEA/ser. L/V/III.3, doc. 13 corr. 1 (1980).
Entry into Force of the American Convention, 1980-1983 INTER-AM. CT. H.R. 7, OEA/ser. L/V/III.3,
doc. 13 corr. 1 (1980).
29
Their names and nationalities are as follows: Thomas Buergenthal (United States), Máximo Cisneros
Sanchez (Peru), Huntley Eugene Munroe (Jamaica), Cesar Ordonez Quintero (Colombia), Rodolfo Piza
Escalante (Costa Rica), Carlos Roberto Reina Idiaquez (Honduras), M. Rafael Urquia (El Salvador).
30
“These states are Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela. Trinidad and Tobago, which had
been a State Party, denounced the American Convention on 26 May 1998, effective 26 May 1999.”
PASQUALUCCI, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 2.
28
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principal vehicle for contributing to international law during that period was its advisory
opinions.31
When the Commission began to refer contentious cases to the Court, and the
Court pronounced violations human rights, it shocked the governments of newly
emerging democracies. These States equated the need for human rights enforcement with
peremptory power, not unlike the prior caudillos. Some feared that States would refuse
to participate in proceedings before the court, a recurring problem before the
International Court of Justice at that time. This fear proved largely unfounded. States
responded to applications filed against them by designating agents, filing memoranda,
and appearing and arguing at public hearings. To be sure, States often filed preliminary
objections, many of which were frivolous; however, when the Court denied these
objections, the states presented their defenses.
The reputation of the Inter-American Court increased as a result of the quality of
its jurisprudence.32 The status of the Court is reflected in the status of State witnesses
who have appeared before it to defend State actions. For example, in the Baena Ricardo
Case,33 in which 270 former State employees alleged that they were illegally dismissed
from their jobs as a result of an ex post facto law, Guillermo Endara, the former president
of Panama, and his vice-president testified before the Court. Eventually, some States
accepted responsibility for the human rights violations before the Court reached a

31

Id.
For criteria referring cases to the Court, see Claudio Grossman, President’s Inaugural Session Speech at
the 95th Regular Meeting of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1115
(1998).
33
Baena Ricardo et al. (270 Workers v. Panama): Merits, Inter-Am. Court H.R., Series C, No. 72, ¶ 65(h)(i) (2001).
32

9

judgment--leaving only the issue of reparations to be decided.34 The acceptance of
international responsibility on the part of the State indirectly acknowledged that an InterAmerican Court judgment attributing responsibility to a State for human rights violations
would be taken seriously—both domestically and internationally.35
State compliance with Court-ordered reparations has similarly moved forward. As
the Court has no coercive mechanisms in and of itself to enforce judgments, some
thought that States would simply ignore them and refuse to make Court-ordered
reparations to the victims. Honduras, under the presidency of Carlos Roberto Reina, a
former Inter-American Court judge, eventually paid the compensation ordered by the
Court. Most other States have also paid pecuniary compensation ordered by the Court,
although many have balked and delayed payment for extensive periods.
Redress extends beyond compensation alone. The Court may also order the State
to take actions or to desist from particular acts. When Peru complied with the Court’s
order to release from prison Maria Elena Loayza Tamayo,36 a college professor, it
marked a new level of State compliance.37 Peru also later released Cesti Hurtado from
prison.38

34

“Cases in which States have accepted international responsibility include Barrios Altos (Chumbipuma
Aguirre et al v Peru) (Merits), Case 75, Inter-Am C.H.R., para 31 ser.c, doc. 75. (2001); Aloeboetoe et al v
Suriname (Merits), Inter-Am. C.H.R., para 22, ser.c, doc. 11(1991); El Amparo v Venezuela (Merits),
Inter-Am. C.H.R., para 19, ser c, doc. 19 (1995); Garrido and Baigorria v Argentina (Merits), Inter-Am
C.H.R., para 25, ser. c, doc. 26, (1996); Del Caracazo v Venezuela (Merits), Inter-Am C.H.R, para 37, ser
c, doc. 58 (1999). Las Palmeras v Colombia (Merits), Inter-Am. C.H.R., para 19, ser c, doc. 90 (2001)
accepting partial responsibility.” PASQUALUCCI, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE , supra note 2 at 8.
35
PASQUALUCCI, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE , supra note 2.
36
See Loayza Tamayo v. Peru (Merits), Inter-Am. C.H.R. para 5, 84, ser. c, doc. 33 (1997).
37
PASQUALUCCI, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 2.
38
Cesti Hurtado v. Peru (Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 29 September 1999) Inter-Am.
C.H.R., order of 19, ser. c, doc. 62 (1999).
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Subsequently, in certain cases when the Court has declared a domestic law or
judgment to be in violation of the American Convention, States have amended the laws,39
domestic courts have declared them unconstitutional,40 or domestic court judgments have
been annulled.41 These developments exalt Inter-American human rights law to
supranational stature.
There exists, however, another level of State compliance with Court orders not yet
commonly observed in the Inter-American system. The Court, in almost every case,
orders the State to investigate, prosecute and punish the individuals responsible for the
human rights violations. These orders seldom find fulfillment. In most cases, impunity
reigns, and the State power structure lacks the means or the will to bring the perpetrators
of human rights violations to justice. Someday, if and when the States regularly follow
Court orders to prosecute and punish the violators, the Court will have contributed
substantially to the fall of impunity and to the specific and general deterrence of human
rights violations in this hemisphere.42
The initial apprehension that the member states would withdraw their acceptance
of the Court’s jurisdiction or denounce the American Convention has not generally met
with reality. Only one State, Trinidad and Tobago,43 has denounced the Convention and
the Court’s jurisdiction, but it later returned with reservations. Peru, which had
announced its intention to withdraw its recognition of the Court’s jurisdiction, has since
reaffirmed its acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction. Moreover, additional States beyond
39

Cantoral Benavides v Peru (Reparations), Inter-Am. C.H.R., para 76, ser c, doc. 88 (2001).
Suarez Rosero v. Ecuador (Reparations) (Art.63 (1), American Convention of Human Rights), Inter-Am.
C.H.R., para 76, ser c, doc. 88 (2001); PASQUALUCCI, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 2.
41
Cesti Hurtado v. Peru (Reparations) Inter-Am. C.H.R., para 15, ser. c, doc. 78, (2001).
42
PASQUALUCCI, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 2.
43
See Natasha Parassran Concepcion, The Legal Implications of Trinidad & Tobago’s Withdrawal from the
American Convention on Human Rights, 16 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 847 (2001).
40
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the original member states have both ratified the Convention, and accepted the Court’s
jurisdiction.44

Agreement for the Court's Establishment and its Impact Towards Compliance:
The Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Costa Rica and the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights45 established the legal context in which the Court
operates within its host country. Some of the portions of this agreement have a direct or
indirect impact on our topic at hand.
Article 1 provides that the IACHR is "autonomous."46
Article 3 helps the Court to build a community of law. 47
Article 5 provides that the Court will enjoy the immunities and privileges in the
"Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the Organization of American States.”48
This article expressly takes "into account the importance and independence of the
Court."49

44

See Press Release, Peruvian Legislative Resolution No. 271532, Inter-Am.C.H.R., CP2/01, at
http://corteidh.or.cr. (last visited Mar. 6, 2005).
45
Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Costa Rica and the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, 1980-1983 INTER-AM. CT. H.R. 16, 17 OEA/ ser. L/III.5, doc. 13 (1981) [hereinafter, Costa
Rica Agreement].
46
This is important because such a body must ideally be independent of the type of political pressure that
could distort its judgment.
47
It provides that the Court may enter into agreements of cooperation with law schools, bar associations,
domestic courts, and research institutions dealing with human rights so that the Court can strengthen the
principles of the Convention and the Court itself. Id. at 18.
48
Id. at 17.
49
Again, this independence is crucial for establishing the impartiality of the Court. This official
acknowledgment of the importance of the Court, while possibly viewed as token, is nonetheless an official
pronouncement by the Government of the Republic of Costa Rica, the host country of the Court.
Especially during this formative period of the Court, such an official endorsement by Costa Rica could only
be seen as a boon towards greater recognition and legitimacy, which aid in compliance. Id. at 17.
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Article 6 protects the premises and archives of the Court from interference by any
government search, seizure or interference.50
Financial protection is also built into the agreement. Article 7 forbids taxes on the
Court with the exception of charges for public utility services. 51
Article 8 further protects the Court's pocketbook by permitting the Court to
operate accounts in any currency, hold funds in a foreign currency, transfer funds
between countries, and convert currency without financial controls, regulations or
moratoria of any kind.52 In this same vein, any judicial or administrative process,
according to Article 9, cannot touch the Court, its assets, income and other property.53
The Court also has what is known as a "total franking privilege."54
After Article 10 begin Chapters III-IX, which largely deal with the privileges and
immunities of the Court and those who appear before the Court.55

50

Given the sensitive nature of rulings against national governments, this safeguard helps embolden the
Court by making its archives and premises inviolate. Id. at 18
- 19.
51
It also bars the imposition of customs, duties or charges for official use by the Court. It specifically
protects the Court's publications from any such customs, duties or charges. This Article prevents retaliatory
charges from being placed on the Court. Economic pressure in these forms is thus forbidden by the
agreement. In this way, the Court is protected from some illicit attempts at swaying or intimidating it by
attacking its figurative pocketbook. Such a measure increases the Court's financial independence. Id. at
19.
52
This monetary authorization without the burden of financial controls, regulations or moratoria would be
important, for example, when there are monetary reparations to handle. If these protections were not in
place, a country ordered to pay reparations could impose regulations that would in effect circumvent the
payment of the reparation. Id. at 17.
53
This immunity includes not being subject to domestic courts unless the IACHR expressly waives its
immunity in a particular case. Article 9 thus gives the Court the liberty to judge without being judged itself
by other courts. Id.
54
What this means is that the IACHR does not have to pay for postage on its mail. Furthermore, the Court
enjoys favorable treatment of its official communications at the level of diplomatic missions as to the rates,
taxes, press rates, and priorities for its communications. These Article 10 privileges come with insulation
against censorship of its correspondence and other official communications of the Court. The Court may
even use codes to relay messages secretly. These measures at once prevent interference with the Court's
communications as well as help facilitate these communications. Id. at 20.
55
These privileges include the granting of travel documents such as visas or diplomatic passports. Also,
the immunities and privileges for judges are grounded minimally in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, which Costa Rica ratified. Chapter IV, Article 14 extends the same immunities and privileges to
the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of the Court with the exception that they shall not be granted the
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Chapter XI, Article 28 provides that Costa Rica will continue to subsidize the
Court annually in an amount not less than its initial grant, which is recorded in the Law of
the General Budget of the Republic of Costa Rica.56
For an introductory overview of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, one
would do well to read "A United States View of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights."57

Compliance Theory
Laurence Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter provide factors pertaining to what
they refer to as supranational adjudication in their rigorous and informative article,
"Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication."58 While their immediate
application is to the European Court of Justice (ECJ),59 the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR)60 and the United Nations Human Rights Committee,61 they explicitly

category of chiefs of mission. Staff receive the privileges and immunities found in the Agreement on
Privileges and Immunities of the Organization of American States of May 15, 1949 as well as any other
treaties in force. Chapter IX, Article 26 c) grants immunity for persons appearing before the Court from all
administrative or judicial proceedings during their stay in Costa Rica, unless the Court waives this
immunity out of necessity. Victims and claimants alike have the same immunities and privileges. Id. at 2025.
56
Id. at 26.
57
Douglass Cassel, A United States View of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in THE MODERN
WORLD OF HUMAN RIGHTS/ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, 209 (1996). It covers the
Court's first 15 years while giving an American professor's view on why the U.S. might consider accepting
the Court's contentious jurisdiction.
58
Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication,
107 YALE L.J., 273 (1997).
59
European Court of Justice, at http://europa.eu.int/institutions/court/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2005).
60
“In the European Court of Human Rights, individuals can sue states-parties to the European Convention
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [ECHR]. Just about every western and eastern European
State (including Russia) is a state-party to the European Convention. As in the Inter-American system,
private individuals and corporations cannot be sued. States, however, can be sued for failure to prevent
foreseeable gross human rights violations committed by private persons. Furthermore, corporations can and often do - sue states-parties. Only in dicta has the European Court recognized that shareholders can sue
in exceptional circumstances. The European Court provides monetary damages, legal fees and costs
awards; however, it does not provide injunctive relief and has not provided punitive damages. Another
aspect of the adequacy of these international tribunal systems concerns the time it takes for the case to
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state how their "checklist" of factors could be applied to other international62 (or
supranational/aspiring towards supranational63 status) bodies. These factors have not
been applied as an aggregate, as far as I know, in relation to the Inter-American system of
human rights.64
What are these factors? Helfer and Slaughter divide up the factors into three main
categories: 1) Factors within the control of states party to an agreement establishing a

reach its conclusion. Assuming that the case is found admissible and the tribunal reaches the merits and
damages award stage, the proceedings can last anywhere from two to ten years, depending on the case's
complexity and the tribunal's interest in a particular case. The Inter-American system will generally take
longer because of its lack of financial and staff resources and each case's two-stage process of going
through both the Commission and Court. On the other hand, in addition to having more money and a larger
staff, cases before the European Court do not have to go through a commission. The Inter-American system
however, does have friendly dispute resolution mechanisms built into it that expedite the resolution of
cases. Unfortunately, the European system no longer appears to have such a strong, friendly dispute
resolution mechanism in place, as the old European Commission of Human Rights was dismantled a few
years ago.” Francisco Forrest Martin, The International Human Rights & Ethical Aspects of the Forum Non
Conveniens Doctrine, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 101 (2003); See The European Court of Human
Rights, at http://www.echr.coe.int/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2005); Luis Ignacio Sanchez Rodriguez, The
American and European Human Rights’ System, LA CORTE Y EL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANOS DE
DERECHOS HUMANOS [The Court and the Inter-American System of Human Rights] (1994), at
http://www.echr.coe.int/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2005).
61
“The United Nations Human Rights Committee was established to monitor the implementation of the
Covenant and the Protocols to the Covenant in the territory of States parties. It is composed of 18
independent experts who are persons of high moral character and recognized competence in the field of
human rights. The Committee convenes three times a year for sessions of three weeks' duration, normally
in March at United Nations headquarters in New York and in July and November at the United Nations
Office in Geneva.” United Nations Human Rights Committee, at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/a/introhrc.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2005).
62
"The term ‘international tribunal’ is referenced in a number of United States statutes. From these
statutory obligations, as interpreted, one can discern a workable definition for international tribunals as: an
objective and impartial adjudicative body established by or with the imprimatur of two or more
governments with the power to make a binding decision as to law or facts. This definition falls between the
two extremes, rejecting a litmus test that excludes many international adjudicative bodies that do not meet
certain artificial categories, but is not so broad as to embrace the whole panoply of potential candidate
institutions.” Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts, International Tribunals, and the Continuum of Deference,
43 VA. J. INT'L L. 675 (2003).
63
“By definition, in a supranational body there is no democratically-legitimate hierarchical superior, as we
understand that notion in a national sense. Rather, there are at best indirect political controls exercised by
national executives over otherwise-autonomous supranational technocratic agents who owe their loyalty to
the membership of the supranational body as a whole rather than to any one particular state.” Peter L.
Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative Character of Supranationalism: The Example of
the European Community, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 628 (1999).
64
Wilson & Perlin, supra note 7; Christina M. Cerna, The Inter-American System for the Protection of
Human Rights, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 195 (2004); Pasqualucci, supra note 2; Michael F. Cosgrove, supra note
24.
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supranational tribunal; 2) factors within the control of the judiciary; 3) and factors often
beyond the control of states or judges.65
Within the first category of factors within the control of states party to the
agreement for a supranational tribunal's formation, they note four factors in descending
order of importance: a) composition of the tribunal; b) caseload or functional capacity of
the court; c) independent fact-finding capacity; and d) formal authority or status as law of
the instrument that the tribunal is charged with interpreting and applying.66
Under factors within the control of the judiciary, this article finds the following
factors the most important: a) awareness of audience; b) neutrality and demonstrated
autonomy from political interests; c) incrementalism; d) quality of legal reasoning; e)
judicial cross-fertilization and dialogue; f) and the form of opinions.67
The third cluster of factors is the one that fits into neither of the first two, broad
categories. The three that this article notes are: a) the nature of the violations; b)
autonomous domestic institutions committed to the rule of law and responsive to citizen
interests; c) and the relative cultural and political homogeneity of states subject to a
supranational tribunal.68
It would be interesting to interact with these factors in reference to what the
IACHR has done69 and what it can yet do.70 The Slaughter/ Helfer model can function as
a base that can aid in analysis.

65

Helfer & Slaughter supra note 58.
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
See Manuel E. Ventura Robles, La Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos: Camino hacia un
Tribunal Permanente, [The Inter-American Court of Human Rights: The Way Towards a Permanent
Court], in LA CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS [The Inter-American Court of Human
Rights] (1986).
66
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While the IACHR has its own particular characteristics, it does draw significantly
from the European bodies.71 The IACHR derives some of its substance (in the American
Convention72) from the same stream that is found in Europe.73 The IACHR even receives
funding from the European Union74 and European Union countries.

Why Do Nations Obey International Law?
Louis Henkin states that "almost all nations observe almost all principles of
international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time"75 (emphasis
omitted). This assertion finds corroboration in a host of studies?76
Andrew T. Guzman notes that, “for years international law scholarship generally
assumed that nations tend to comply with international law.”77 Yet some scholars

70

See Augusto Cancado Trindade & Manuel E. Ventura Robles, El Futuro de la Corte InterAmericana de
Derechos Humanos [The Future of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights] (2003). To contemplate
where the Inter-American system is at, and what direction it can go, see also Brenda Cossman, Reform,
Revolution, or Retrenchment? International Human Rights in the Post-Cold War Era, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J.
339 (1991).
71
European Court, supra note 59.
72
The American Convention of Human Rights (American Convention), signed in 1969, incorporated the
Commission and assigned it specified specific powers under the Convention. It also created the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights (Inter-American Court). The American Convention entered into force in
1978. See the American Convention of Human Rights, at http://www.hrcr.org/docs/American_Convention
(February 18th, 2005); NIETO NAVIA, INTRODUCCIÓN AL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO DE PROTECCIÓN A LOS
DERECHOS HUMANOS [Introduction to the Inter-American System of Human Rights] (1993).
73
As regards regional human rights systems, “three systems are in existence today, one in Europe, one in
the Americas, and the third, in Africa. The European system is the oldest of the three and is generally
considered to be the most effective. The institutional structure established by the American Convention is
modeled on that of the European Convention. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the
Inter-American Court have functions similar to those of their European counterparts” Buergenthal, supra
note 24, at 15. For a comparison between the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the European
Court of Human Rights, see Martin, supra note 60.
74
See European Union, at http://europa.eu.int (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
75
LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979), quoted in Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations
Obey International Law? 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997); see also David H. Moore, A Signaling Theory of
Human Rights Compliance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 879 (2003).
76
Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law? YALE L.J. 2599 (1997). In footnote 2
Koh cites a long string of studies along these lines.
77
See Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823, 1826
(2002); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Treaties Make a Difference? Human Rights Treaties and the Problem of
Compliance, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1937 (2002).
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contrarily claim that noncompliance is common. Tragically, the assumption of
compliance may contradict the reality the most in the realm of international human rights.
Despite the great increase in human rights instruments since World War II,
noncompliance remains more common than one might expect.78 In the IACHR, however,
compliance (at least on some levels) has stayed the norm with noncompliance the
exception.
The Managerial Model
The New Sovereignty, a crowning work by Professor Abram Chayes of Harvard
Law School and former Legal Adviser to the U.S. State Department, together with
Antonia Handler Chayes, who served as former Undersecretary of the U.S. Air Force,
contend that a "managerial model" best accounts for compliance with international law
within treaty regimes,79 such as the one placing countries under the jurisdiction of the
IACHR.80 The Chayes81 state, "[T]he fundamental instrument for maintaining
compliance with treaties at an acceptable level is an iterative process of discourse among
the parties, the treaty organization, and the wider public."82 This is in contradistinction to
the view that the looming threat of sanctions coerces countries to follow the treaty
regime. This observation seems to fit well with the compliance in the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights--because the Organization of American States (OAS) General

78

See Moore, supra note75.
According to David Moore, "none of these approaches, however, offers a comprehensive description of
compliance with international law in general or human rights in particular. To name some of the more
apparent shortcomings in his view, the Chayes’s managerial model assumes a tendency to comply rather
than explaining compliance." Id.
80
ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS, 3 (1995).
81
“According to the Chayes, treaty compliance also derives from the need to maintain one’ s status within a
highly interrelated community of states.” Moore, supra note 76.
82
Id.
79
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Assembly83 has yet to administer sanctions upon any member state. Thus, the threat of
sanctions is apparently not a live threat, which makes it implausible as the impetus for
compliance with the judgments of the IACHR.
Fairness and Legitimacy
New York University Law Professor Thomas Franck avers that the fairness of the
international rules themselves constitutes the linchpin of compliance in his book Fairness
in International Law and Institutions.84 Franck speaks of nations bowing to international
law even without the hatchet of formal enforcement over their heads in consideration of
right process (legitimacy) and distributive justice.85 These notions at their best tie into
the foundational discussion that preceded this section. Much of Franck's own
philosophical foundations can be found in The Power of Legitimacy among Nations
(1990).86
Transnational Legal Process
Harold Koh,87 who serves as the Dean of Yale Law School and formerly as an
Associate Secretary of State, adopts a view of transnational legal process, which is the
"complex process of institutional interaction whereby global norms are not just debated
83

See Organization of American States, at
http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=../../documents/eng/structure.asp (last visited Mar. 9,
2005), which gives the structure of the General Assembly of the OAS.
84
THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995). Franck's 1993
Hague Lectures in Public International Law provided a foundation from which to work.
85
Susan Sturm provides an overview of the literature on judicial legitimacy. Judicial legitimacy is more
crucial for the IACHR because it does not have coercive measures at its disposal to compel compliance
Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 1355 (1991); see also Scott C.
Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor 73 TEX. L. REV. 1307 (1995). Scott identifies three
factors that have an impact on judicial legitimacy. These factors are: 1) unanimity or near unanimity in
decisions; 2) professional civility in opinions; 3) and continuity of the law over time. The IACHR often
meets the unanimity or near unanimity in decisions factor, seems to be a model of professional civility and
decorum, and is still relatively young, which does not allow extensive continuity of the law over time.
86
THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990).
87
“Harold Koh has argued that nations comply with international law as a result of repeated participation in
transnational legal interactions with state and non-state actors which leads to internalization of international
norms and the formation of national identity around those norms.” See Moore, supra note 75.
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and interpreted, but ultimately internalized by domestic legal systems."88 Koh
acknowledges value in the works of the Chayes and Franck but deems them inadequate.89
Koh sees a massive sea change in the international law scene. The nature of this
change includes: 1) an erosion of national sovereignty; 2) a multiplying of international
regimes, institutions and nonstate actors; 3) a blurring of the public-private distinction (in
international law; 4) the rapid formation of customary and treaty-based rules; 5) the
increasing interpenetration of international systems and domestic ones.90
Are these traits characteristic of the Western Hemisphere where the InterAmerican system holds sway? To track Koh's list: 1) state sovereignty seems to persist
more in the Western Hemisphere than it does in places like Europe; 2) the formation of
the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights,91 the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights,92 the American Convention of Human Rights,93 the North American Free Trade

88

Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, supra note 76, at 2602; see also Harold Hongju Koh,
Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996).
89
Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, supra note 76.
90
Id. at 2604.
91
“The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (Commission) was created in 1959 to serve as a
mechanism for overseeing national implementation of such human rights commitments. Composed of
seven members elected in their individual capacity, the Commission started operating in 1960 with a vague
mandate. In 1965, its competence was expanded to accept communications, request information from
governments, and make recommendations "with the objective of bringing about more effective observance
of human rights." In 1967, the OAS Charter was amended, and the Commission became a principal organ
of the OAS. The Commission has three forms of jurisdiction. Its conventional jurisdiction applies to the
states that have become parties to the American Convention. Its judicial invocative jurisdiction provides the
competence to invoke the Inter-American Court; it applies to the state-parties to the American Convention
that have accepted the Inter-American Court's jurisdiction. While these two forms of jurisdiction depend
upon adherence to the American Convention, the Commission's declaration jurisdiction applies to all
parties to the OAS Charter, indeed, to all states in the Americas. Hence, every independent state in the
Western Hemisphere, even those which have not yet become party to the American Convention, is subject,
in some form, to the Commission's jurisdiction. The Commission's jurisdiction may be invoked by citizens
and organizations within the hemisphere.” Michael Reisman, Practical Matters for consideration in the
establishment of a Regional Human Rights Mechanism: Lessons from the Inter-American experience, ST.
LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 89, (1995); see also, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, at
http://www.cidh.org/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2005).
92
See Reisman supra, note 91.
93
Id.
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Agreement (NAFTA),94 MercoSur,95 the Organization of American States96 itself and
other examples seem to show a multiplication of international regimes and institutions.97
Nonstate actors like Center for Justice and International Law (CEJIL),98 Amnesty
International,99 Human Rights Watch,100 the Centers for International Human Rights at
Universities like American University, University of Notre Dame, Northwestern
University and others have multiplied as well. 3) Private companies are becoming
increasingly concerned about human rights and other such areas traditionally deemed to
be within the realm of public, international law.101 4) some of the examples under 2)
above illustrate the formation of customary and treaty based rules. For the purposes of

94

“The North American Free Trade Agreement is ‘preeminently’ a trade agreement .Its main purpose is the
establishment of a free trade zone between Canada, Mexico and the United States. The agreement
enumerates its objectives as the elimination of trade barriers with respect to goods and services; the
furthering of conditions of fair competition; the extension of investment possibilities; the protection of
intellectual property rights; the creation of effective procedures concerning its implementation, application,
joint administration, and dispute settlement; and the set-up of a framework for further cooperation.” Patrick
Specht, The Dispute Settlement Systems of the WTO and NAFTA: Analysis and Comparison, 27 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L 57 (1998).
95
The Common Market of the South (Mercado Comun del Sur) was created by the Treaty of Asuncion
signed by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay in 1991. Chile and Bolivia became associate members
in 1996 and 1997, respectively. This is the most important international commitment among these
countries. See Mercosur, at http://www.mercosur.org.uy (last visited Feb. 18, 2005).
96
The Organization of American States (OAS) is a pioneer of modern human rights law. The OAS Charter
of 1948 incorporates the "fundamental rights of the individual" as one of the Organization's founding
principles. See The Organization of American States, at http://www.oas.org/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2005); see
also THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, ROBERT NORRIS & DINAH SHELTON, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
AMERICAS: SELECTED PROBLEMS, (3d ed. rev., 1990).
97
The Organization of American States (OAS) is a pioneer of modern human rights law. The OAS Charter
of 1948 incorporates the "fundamental rights of the individual" as one of the Organization's founding
principles. See The Organization of American States, at http://www.oas.org/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2005); see
also THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, ROBERT NORRIS & DINAH SHELTON, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
AMERICAS: SELECTED PROBLEMS, (3d ed. rev., 1990).
98
The Center for Justice and International Law (CEJIL) is a non-governmental, non-profit organization
with consultative status before the Organization of American States (OAS), the United Nations (UN). A
central component of the work of the organization is the defense of human rights before the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights ("the Commission") and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ("the
Court”). See Center for Justice and International Law, at http://www.cejil.org/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2005).
99
See Amnesty International, at http://www.amnesty.org/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2005).
100
See Human Rights Watch, at http://www.hrw.org/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2005).
101
Many observers have noted this trend, including Judge Delissa Ridgeway of the Court of International
Trade. Judge Delissa Ridgeway address, ABA Panel on International Law at the ABA National
Conference (August 4, 2001).
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this article, the American Convention of Human Rights102 is the most pertinent example.
5) The work of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights powerfully illustrates the
inter-penetration of international and domestic systems in at least several ways: a) the
obligation of nations to change their laws to be in conformity with a judgment of the
court; b) the fact that those in the executive branches of domestic governments are often
charged with carrying out the Court's ruling; c) that domestic judicial and investigatory
bodies have been ordered by the Court to continue investigations or judicial proceedings;
d) the judgments of the Court are sometimes reported on by domestic media channels. So
the changes in the international scene in general are largely found in the Western
Hemisphere, the Inter-American system of human rights providing the key example.
This analysis helps to map the matrix of compliance.
Self- Interest
Some scholars try to root compliance in self-interest: “Jack Goldsmith and Eric
Posner have rejected the notion that nations feel a sense of obligation to obey
international law and have treated compliance as an ephemeronal result of the
convergence of a nation’s interest with the tenets of the law.”103 The immediate financial
cost of complying with the judgments would tend to cut against this view. However, the
longer-term interests such as reputation, trade, and international relations could factor in
favor of this view. Along these lines, Moore states that:
Respecting human rights tend to impose immediate costs-restraints on governments
power or the costs of providing opportunities. Violating human rights provides, from the
governments’ s perspective, the immediate benefits of unrestrained action, while risking
future costs, such as stunted economic growth. Complying with human rights thus
demonstrates a willingness to restrain present use of power for long-term benefits, while

102
103

See Ridgeway, supra note 101.
See Moore, supra note 75.

22

violating human rights preserves the full range of governments' power in the present at
104
the expense of future gains.

In this sense, Jo M. Pasqualucci refers to the informal effectiveness of the Inter-American
Court in the sense that in repeated instances, referral of a case to the Court, or the Court's
scheduling of a public hearing has brought about positive action within the state
involved.105
A Comparison With Europe
For a comparative analysis, Mark W. Janis, who holds the William F. Starr
Professorship at the University of Connecticut, writes about the effectiveness of the
European system.106 He breaks down his study of compliance into three categories: 1)
judgments (and decisions), 2) legal rules, and 3) the legal system itself.107 He surveys the
literature in these categories with prodigious footnotes.108
Janis suggests four possible tests for legitimacy, which he deems as "the most
crucial 'practical' test for the efficacy of the Strasbourg legal system."109 These tests are:
1) the case load in the European Court of Human Rights, 2) the acceptance of what were
the two optional clauses of the European Convention, 3) the growth in the number of

104

Id.

105 105

“The referral of a case to an international court focuses international attention on the situation, and the
publicity often curtails some abuses even before the Court reaches a judgment. Most states are surprisingly
sensitive about their international reputations and world image. According to a former United States
representative to the U.N. Commission of Human rights, despite the harsh realities of power politics, world
opinion is a force to be reckoned with. Governments devote much time and energy, both in and out of the U.N.,
to defending and embellishing their own human rights image and demeaning that of others.” Jo M. Pasqualucci,
The Inter-American Human Rights System: Establishing Precedents and Procedure in Human Rights Law,
26 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 297 (1994-1995); see also Jo M. Pasqualucci, Preliminary Objections
Before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Legitimate Issues and Illegitimate tactics 40 VA. J INT’
L L. 1 (1999).
106
Janis, supra note 23; see also Christian Tomuschat, Quo Vadis, Argentoratum? The Success Story of the
European Convention on Human Rights and a Few Dark Stains, 13 HUM. RTS L.J. 401 (1992). Tomuschat
devotes the third section of this article to enforcement, which he deems the real test.
107
Janis supra note 106, at 40.
108
Id. passim.
109
Id. at 44.
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states joining the Council of Europe and ratifying the Convention,110 and 4) an increasing
recognition of the legitimacy of the system.111 Janis concludes by noting the impressive
level of compliance and gives a call to further studies on this heretofore high level of
compliance (by international law standards) with Strasbourg law.112
Parallel analysis of the Inter-American system of human rights reveals: 1) a
dramatically increased and increasing case load in the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights; 2) broad acceptance and ratification of the American Convention of Human
Rights with few reservations; 3) acceptance of the jurisdiction of the IACHR by the crush
of Latin American countries. The English speaking countries like the U.S.A., Canada,
and the English speaking Caribbean countries are exceptions in the hemisphere. With the
acceptance of Mexico and Brazil, it is essentially a solid mass of countries under the
Court's jurisdiction from Mexico through Central America down to the bottom of South
America; 4) and an increasing recognition of the legitimacy of the system, even by
Peru,113 which had previously posed the most serious challenge to the Court.
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Albania (13.07.1995), Andorra (10.11.1994), Armenia (25.01.2001), Austria (16.04.1956), Azerbaijan
(25.01.2001), Belgium (05.05.1949), Bosnia & Herzegovina (24.04.2002), Bulgaria (07.05.1992),Croatia
(06.11.1996), Cyprus (24.05.1961), Czech Republic (30.06.1993),Denmark (05.05.1949),Estonia
(14.05.1993), Finland (05.05.1989), France (05.05.1949), Georgia (27.04.1999), Germany (13.07.1950),
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Conclusion:
Over twenty years ago, international human rights law was not taken very seriously. It
was considered to be "soft law". However, over the years, there have been dozens of
cases before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights114 and thousands of cases in
which the European Court of Human Rights115 have found states in violation of their
international legal obligations with respect to human rights. Of those many rulings, only a
few states have refused or been slow to comply with these Courts' orders. There is little
doubt that now international human rights law is "hard law," i.e., effective law in many
respects. Therefore, international human rights fora generally are both available, and
provide remedies to violations of human rights with which states often comply.
Professor Douglass Cassel, the Director of the Center for International Human
Rights at Northwestern University School of Law, has looked more at state compliance
with international law in the Inter-American system than just about any other legal
scholar.116 The judgments of the IACHR are considered "hard law" as they are legally
binding.117 Cassel notes that:
States have been more apt to comply with judgments and orders of the Court than with
resolutions of the Commission. However, they do so in part because the Court, unlike the
Commission, is a judicial body, and is also the second and final instance in the process,
whereas the Commission is the first. Greater compliance with Court orders, then, is due
not only to the distinction between soft and hard law, but to the differing nature of the
promulgating institutions and their decision making processes.118
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Cassel brings together legitimacy's "compliance pull" from Prof. Franck,
the Chayes' "iterative process of discourse", as well as Koh's "transnational legal
process" as mutually compatible theoretical frameworks for viewing the InterAmerican system.119 All of these things point to a culture of compliance, an
informal ideological regime—ideas akin to what Helfer and Slaughter put forth.120
To be a member in good standing of the informal "Latin American Club"121 so to
say, a state would do well to comply with the judgments of the IACHR, at least
cosmetically if not substantively. Otherwise, tacit but starkly understood
repercussions follow from the other members of the "Club".122
Similar statements can be made about the Inter-American system. Up to the
present, compliance has been rather impressive in regards to financial reparations: yet
room for improvement exists with orders to States to prosecutes such crimes in their
domestic systems.
At present, much room yet exists for many further studies of compliance in the
Inter-American. This study comes as a single salvo in what could be a steady stream of
scholarship on compliance in the Inter-Am
erican system yet to come. May it encourage
further analysis on this vitally important part of the pursuit of justice in this hemisphere!
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